We use utility functions to explain the conditions under which political parties will incorporate interest group positions onto the party platform. We test the model's implications using content analysis of 1996, 2000, and 2004 DNC party platforms and platform hearing testimony.
I. Introduction
Every four years, the nation's two major parties assemble to nominate a presidential candidate, draw attention to their party, and adopt a platform. And every four years, stories abound of backroom deals struck when organized factions demand the party adopt a plank that veers the platform from the party median. In this paper we investigate the extent to which interest groups can influence the content and substance of party platforms, and we demonstrate the conditions under which they can successfully do so. While some debate may exist about the role and worth of party platforms in the United States' electoral system because its candidates are not beholden to enact its policy positions, US parties have incentives to carefully consider the content of their platforms because they signal the importance of party interests. Platforms are not important in the US as commitments to future behavior; they are important because they indicate which populations are most significant to the party's desired electoral outcome.
The conventional wisdom is that platforms are used to excite and entice party activists with symbolic gestures that have little substantive consequence for policy or elections. We argue that both parties and groups view platforms with a utilitarian eye. As vote maximizers, parties use platforms to motivate activists to vote and mobilize on behalf of the party. Parties have incentives to help groups articulate their interests as long as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Groups seek policy outcomes and interest articulation, seeing platforms as means toward the latter, and therefore have incentives to develop characteristics that will distinguish them to platform drafters. We develop a model to outline these characteristics in detail and investigate the model's implications by analyzing three years of Democratic National Committee party platforms and the testimony of 80 interest groups. Our findings show that parties reward loyalty and ideological congruence, but that they are less responsive to a group's resources.
The contributions of this piece are three-fold. First, we explain the conditions under which party platforms should be influenced by interest group demands-an interaction not previously understood. Second, we offer a theoretical and empirical contribution to literature that posits that interest groups and parties are not competing political interests, but extensions of the same complex political network in which actors and organizations seek to create more and stronger connections to other like-minded political actors (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009 ).
Third, we employ rare data, transcripts from platform-drafting hearings, and new content analysis technology to engage in an empirical test of a formal model. Our paper takes unique theoretical and empirical steps toward a rigorous quantitative study of the "influence" groups have over platforms.
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II. Organized Interests and Political Party Platforms
Considerable debate exists over the relevance of party platforms. Critics have been quick to note that in the American electoral system, candidates are not bound to their party's platform.
Ostrogorski states that " [t] he platform, which is supposed to be the party's profession of faith and its programme of action is only a farce-the biggest farce of all the acts of this great parliament of the party" (1964, . David Truman famously writes that "the platform is generally regarded as a document that says little, binds no one, and is forgotten by politicians as quickly as possible after it is adopted" (Truman 1951, 282-83) . Rozell, Wilcox, and Madland (2006) argue that interest groups "struggle to influence the party platforms--which, in practice, often embody nothing more than the momentary sentiments of a majority of party activists" (34).
Yet Snyder and Ting (2002) The Committee revised the platform and submitted it to the full convention for discussion, debate, and adoption by delegate vote. The entire process spanned six months and four cities. To the 186 people who served on the platform drafting committee, as well as the thousands of convention delegates who adopted the final platform, something important was taking place. We argue that the platform drafting process in this example and others is important to different entities in different ways.
How Platforms (and Parties) Can Matter to Interest Groups
Anecdotes of backroom strong-arming between groups and party leaders offer primary evidence that platform-drafting is important to groups. Consider the conflict between Presidential candidate Bob Dole and pro-life advocates at the 1996 GOP convention. The platform committee had adopted a strongly pro-life plank in the platform, but Dole wanted to include a statement of tolerance, hoping to appeal to party moderates. While trying to foster a sentiment of compromise, Dole confronted a platform committee stacked with grassroots activists from the Christian Coalition, and his efforts ultimately failed (Rozell, Wilcox and Madland 2006, 56-7) .
Analytical evidence also challenges the conventional wisdom of the inefficacy of platforms. Pomper and Lederman (1980) can coordinate their efforts, parties may view groups as an efficient means to achieve their voter mobilization goals, and will therefore seek to reward those groups best positioned to do so.
But how, exactly, do parties decide which groups to reward? How do they determine which groups will be most effective in helping them achieve their electoral goals? Below we develop a model to help discern the conditions under which parties will articulate interest groups' policy preferences into their party platform.
III. Modeling Party/Group Interaction During Platform Creation
Although little formal literature addresses the group/party interaction during platform drafting, models of platform placement have sought explanations as to why that placement in a two-party system does not converge on the ideological median Downs (1957) predicted. Snyder and Ting (2002) present candidate heterogeneity, Calvert (1985) points to uncertainty about outcomes, Palfrey (1984) credits third party entry, and Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) assert that candidate reputations are responsible for the divergence. To this literature, we suggest the addition of a group/party interaction, and an interest group effect, as a determinant of platform placement. Our model addresses how parties deal with group preferences during platform creation while groups strive to have their interests articulated by parties, and suggests that interest group support can be strong enough to pull a party's platform away from the ideological median under certain conditions. Those conditions are the same conditions determining which groups will have their interests articulated on a party's platform.
Consider the interaction of two interest groups, and , and two political parties, and , during the platform-drafting process. Each entity has preferences over a set of outcomes, which factor into an ideal point on a one-dimensional ideological spectrum. Each also has basic beliefs about the relative ideal points of all other entities and the potential vote share of parties.
We assume parties to be vote-maximizing unitary actors 5 that present one platform to the public.
Groups are not unitary actors (an assumption supported by several branches of group theory).
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Groups compete with each other to have their interests articulated in campaign platforms.
Parties compete with each other for votes, and thus also compete to gain the vote shares of large blocks of voters aligned in interest groups, as well as unaligned voters. Each group is allowed to testify with an oral statement at platform drafting hearings, to issue campaign contributions, and to promise to support either, both, or neither party in the election. Each party then weighs the mobilization potential of each group against the cost it may bear by including that group's interests on its platform, signified by moving its platform closer to that group's ideal. Platform placement depends on that calculation.
Group i's utility function is:
5 Consistent with, among others, Laver and Shepsle 1998; Cox and McCubbins 1986; Cox 1990. 6 See Sabatier and McLaughlin (1990) , who survey arguments that leaders and members may have congruent interests (exchange theory), may be more extreme (commitment theory), and may be less extreme (moderating elite theory) than members. Each accepts that group leaders' commitments do not guarantee the behavior of all members.
Where m is the utility the group receives simply from testifying and articulating its interests, is each party's platform position on the ideal spectrum, and is the ideal point of the group. is the percentage of votes receives (0 ≤ ≤ 1), and is the percentage of votes receives (0
. is the cost of supporting one or both parties (cost of donating money; cost to travel and prepare statement for hearing; cost in possible negative image from associating with one or both parties either among members or among non-members; cost that one party may offer less concessions if they think the group's allegiance is tied too closely to the opposition). In other words, group utility is based on the platform placement and vote share parties receive, plus an overall benefit groups get from articulating their own interests, minus their participation cost.
Party utility depends on the quantity of votes received. When a group supports a party, the party's estimation of the value of that support depends on its estimation of the group's ability to influence in-group individuals' decisions about whether and how to vote, as well as its estimation of the group's ability to mobilize non-group individuals as voters behind the group's commitments. Party i's utility function is: The farther away a group is from the party platform, the less likely its mobilization potential is to party's position in relation to the opposition party, or to make it vulnerable to entry of a third party. This is not to say that voters in median positions will not be courted by the party, or its candidate, in other ways, but simply that the platform itself will not be used to that end.
Under what conditions will a group's interests will be articulated in the party platform?
We glean the following propositions from the discussion above: 
Discussion
In the Downs model of a two-party system with a single ideological dimension, both parties cluster around the median, positioning their platforms so as to capture the person whose vote ensures greater than 50% of the electorate. For the study of interest articulation through platform placement, Downs' model issues one main implication. The voters whose interests are articulated in party platforms are those with positions ideologically similar to the median.
By allowing voters to coalesce into groups, our model establishes the theoretical possibility that voters without median positions can have their interests articulated by credibly promising groups of votes and shifting the platform closer to their ideal points. Voters can thereby have their interests articulated at the party platform level at times beyond those when group and median interests already coincide. Empirically, we should expect interest groups to distinguish themselves based on the number of voters they can credibly promise to a given party or candidate, ideological position, and concentration of support (loyalty).
IV. Data and Methods
We seek to explain the conditions under which interest groups are able to influence the development of political party platforms. Our theoretical model dictates that in order to do so, we must operationalize a group's potential to mobilize voters in terms of its resources, its loyalty to a party, and its relative ideological position vis-à-vis a party. Specifically, we require a spatial measurement of party platforms and an equivalent spatial measurement of interest groups' policy positions. We expect to observe that loyal groups ideologically close to the status quo position of the party, and with the resources to mobilize voters, will be rewarded by the party through platform concessions that move the platform closer to the group ideal.
As platform hearings provide a venue for groups to offer testimony, evidence, speech, and/or written comments on their views of the party platform, testimony from those hearings provide the source data from which to estimate the spatial positions of groups trying to influence platform creation. Our unit of analysis is a group-year, which accounts for each group that testified at a DNC platform hearing in 1996, 2000, or 2004 (N=80) . Our dependent variable, as guided by the model, is the difference between the group's testimony and the DNC platform in a given year. We make this comparison by analyzing the content of the testimonies and platform using the Wordscores software (Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) , more on this below).
Using Text as Data
Recent advances in content analysis make using text as data more accessible, less time intensive, and less error prone than previously. Software, such as "Readme," "Wordscores," and "Wordfish" treat individual words as data points (see Hopkins and King 2007; Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003; Laver and Garry 2000; Monroe and Maeda 2004; Proksch and Slapin 2008; Quinn, et al. 2006; Slapin and Proksch 2008) . Requiring little or no human coding, they eliminate user error through an automated analytical process.
Using the Wordscores Stata software code developed by Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) , we analyze party platforms and hearing transcripts, producing spatial estimates of policy positions based on word frequencies, including standard errors and confidence intervals. The output allows us to assess whether the differences between the platforms and the hearing transcripts are due to error (measurement or random) or due to substantive significance.
The Laver et al. (2003) technology utilizes two types of text. First, one must identify a "reference text" with known, well-defined policy dimensions that can be estimated confidently.
Word frequencies in the reference text are used to calculate the probability that a given word comes from a particular reference text. The user then assigns an a priori policy dimension to the reference texts and uses the calculated probabilities to generate a numerical word score for each word. That score is the expected policy position on any member of the second type of text, a "virgin text," given a single word from that virgin text.
This method strips words of their "substantive" contribution to the meaning of text, and assigns policy scores by "treating words purely as data associated with a set of reference texts whose policy positions can be confidently estimated or assumed" (Laver et al. 2003, 313) . One can think of their procedure as a sort of "Bayesian reading of the virgin texts" (ibid.). Each word from a virgin text provides a small amount of information about which reference text it most closely resembles. The scored words are then aggregated; the more words scored, the more robust the estimates. Ultimately, they argue, one is left with a robust estimation of how closely a virgin text resembles a reference text based solely on a blind word frequency association, which is more objective, and less artificial, than traditional manual dictionary coding techniques.
The Wordscores technique works particularly well for our purposes since we seek to demonstrate whether interest groups have been able to affect the content of platforms. The more congruence there is between a particular group's testimony and the party platform, the more influence the group has had over the platform. We therefore present preliminary information based on carefully selected reference and virgin texts.
To utilize this software, we first obtained the full texts (in hardcopy form) of the party platform hearings held by the Democratic Party in 1996, 2000, and 2004. 8 We scanned the documents, cleaned them into plain text, and removed unnecessary information, extracting testimony and question responses (if any) for each interest group that participated. Party websites supplied the full text of each party's platform, while group websites supplied mission statements for each interest group, which we used to estimate group ideal positions.
The reference texts for this project are the party platforms of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC). We obtained independent scores for these reference texts from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens 2009).
9 Table 1 presents the ideological scores and word counts for all reference texts.
[ Table 1 Goes About Here]
Dependent Variable
In Graphs 1 -3 we display the raw Wordscores results for each of the three platforms and the group testifiers.
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The graphs provide a general sense of the distribution of the data, the types of groups involved, and which types of groups tend to be closer to the platform. To calculate the extent to which an interest group received concessions from the party on its platform we 8 Although we intended to estimate this process for both Democratic and Republican Parties, the RNC has denied us access to their hearing testimony. 9 The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) is a large-scale international project that seeks to perform content analysis on the manifestos from all political parties for all nations across time. Much of the data for this ambitious project has been made publically available (Budge 2001; Budge et al. 2001 ). However, after corresponding with its principle investigators we were told that the specific data we sought was both not fully published, and what was published included errors. We are grateful to Andrea Volkens, PI in the CMP, who personally provided us with their ideological estimates of the Republican and Democratic party platforms for the years we sought. 10 We have removed interest group names to preserve confidentiality. 
Independent Variables
Resources To measure a group's voter mobilization resources, we generate a standardized index for each group in our population that is based on four characteristics of groups known to affect their ability to mobilize voters (Kollman 1998) : number of members, number of paid full-time staff, reported budget, and reported revenue.
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Each measure is standardized among groups, then summed and standardized again. The mobilization measure ranges from -.866 to 3.78 (mean=0, SD=1).
Interest group ideology is operationalized using content analysis. Empirically testing our formal model requires that we have a measure of each group's ideological position, independent of our dependent variable and the texts used to create it. To develop such a measure we perform an additional Wordscores content analysis on groups' mission statements from their websites. (2008), the groups' individual web pages, archived webpages of groups, and phone calls to groups asking for information. To the extent possible, we have collected information about groups that is accurate for the year in which they provided testimony. 12 We were unable to obtain mission statements for groups in the past, so the mission statements were collected from the web in summer of 2008, which introduces some measurement error into the model. In addition to official For the purposes of our analysis we are interested in groups' ideological positions relative to the party's position, or status quo, at the time the group gave its testimony. The best estimate of the party's ideological position prior to the adoption of the new platform is the position of the previous platform. We therefore used the CMP estimate of the DNC and RNC party platforms in the election year preceding the group's testimony as the reference texts in the Wordscores analysis (so the ideological position relative to the party for a group that testified in 1996 is estimated using the DNC 1992 platform CMP score.
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We then square the difference between each group's ideological position and the Wordscores estimate of the party's prior year platform score, and subtract it from 1 to enable interpretation similar to that of the dependent variable.
Ideology has mean -2,591.4, standard deviation 2,248, and range -11,229.3 to -153.1.
Loyalty is measured as the percentage of campaign contributions made by each interest
group's Political Action Committee (opensecrets.org), or by individual employees of the group, to the Democratic Party during the two-year campaign cycle of the testimony (fec.gov).
14 Groups that give a high proportion of their campaign funds to Democratic candidates can be interpreted as Democratic loyalists. Groups that give to both parties, or give a majority of their funds to Republican candidates, are seen as less likely to mobilize all their followers behind the Democrats. Additionally, we weight the percentage by the total amount of money the group gave to Democratic candidates. This variable has a mean of 411,646.10, a standard deviation of 565,031.90, and ranges of 0 to 2,246,640. Most groups in the sample give heavily to Democrats.
There are 24 groups have no PAC and no employee contributions tracked by the FEC.
"mission statements" we used "about us" or other similar brief descriptions of groups' purposes. There were 5 groups for whom no such statement was available. 13 The RNC platform is included for reference only, which increases the accuracy of the Wordscores output. 
V. Results and Analysis
To test our hypotheses about the relative impact of mobilization potential in the form of resources, loyalty, and ideology on a party's willingness to incorporate a group's interests into its platform, we estimate a linear regression model. Because we have an unbalanced panel that crosses three time periods and the number of cross-sectional units far exceeds the number of time periods (N=80, T=3), our data do not fit the T > N restriction desired for standard cross-sectional time series analysis (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995, 644 ). Yet we are concerned about accounting for heteroskedasticity, heterogeneity in the cross-sections, and contemporaneous autocorrelations.
We therefore estimate the model with robust standard errors, cluster the regression on individual interest groups, and insert timewise fixed effects of dummies for each platform year (appropriate for short panels, see Arellano 2003 , Wooldridge 2003 . Overall, the results of our analysis results comport with our expectations (see Table 2 ). We discuss each estimate below.
[ Table 2 Goes About Here]
Resources We expected groups with greater resources to mobilize voters to receive more platform concessions, indicated by a positive and significant coefficient. Our coefficient is not in the expected direction and it cannot be considered different from zero, thus failing to support our expectation. We suspect that it is extraordinarily difficult for interest groups to send a signal of resources credibly, particularly if members of one group are also members of other groups.
Organized groups have a difficult time indicating that they can successfully mobilize voters because parties know that groups have few mechanisms to mandate voting behavior from their memberships. Groups with very large memberships tend to be less cohesive and therefore less able to guarantee that their members would vote, while smaller groups sacrifice size at the expense of cohesion. It is possible that the extent to which some groups indicate their willingness and capacity to mobilize voters for the party is not captured by our index measure; however, it is not clear what objective measure would be superior.
Loyalty
We expect groups that demonstrate more loyalty and commitment to the Democratic party to be more likely to receive platform concessions. Parties have an incentive to reward loyal organizations in order to entice them to vote and to work for the party. The positive and significant coefficient on Loyalty shows that groups that give a higher proportion of their contributions, and more overall contributions, to Democrats are indeed more likely to receive platform concessions.
Ideology We posit that groups ideologically closer to the status quo position of the party are more likely to be rewarded platform concessions. The positive and significant coefficient on
Ideological Congruence shows that this is indeed the case. While some might argue that this measure is simply capturing the party's willingness to give concessions to groups to whom it gave concessions in the past, we would remind the reader that this measure does not capture a group's lagged concessions from the party. Although we expect a group's mission statement to overlap ideologically with its testimony, we argue that they are far from the same statement or document, and that they reflect different ambitions of the group. The mission statement is a superior representation of the aggregate ideological leanings of the interest group. By comparing a group's mission statement to the ideological position of the party's prior platform we capture the relative difference between the general position of the group and the status quo point of the party. We find that when this distance is narrow, parties are more likely to include a group's preferences in their platform.
Substantive interpretation of these results is complicated by the somewhat substantively meaningless Wordscores values; however, Wordscores values allow us to discriminate relative differences between groups. We therefore calculate a series of predicted probabilities to help provide some intuition to the findings.
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In Graph 4 we show the predicted concession value for an interest group with a mean level of resource mobilization potential (lower bar), and for a group with mobilization potential that is 1 standard deviation greater than the mean (upper bar), with all other variables held at their mean. The graph shows that there is virtually no difference in predicted concessions between these two groups; the overlap of the standard error bars shows that the estimates are not statistically different from one another.
In Graph 5 we show the predicted concession value for party loyalty of a group with a mean level of loyalty (lower bar) and a group with 1 standard deviation greater than the mean level of loyalty (upper bar), with all other variables held at their mean. The graph shows groups with greater loyalty to the Democrats are more likely to receive concessions from the Party than a group with an average demonstration of loyalty. The standard error bars indicate that there is a significant difference between the estimates and we can conclude that all else being equal, groups that demonstrate more loyalty will receive more platform concessions. This 1 standard deviation increase in loyalty corresponds to an increase in concessions of 376 "points" on the Wordscore scale, a 12.2% increase over the mean.
Considering ideological congruence, we find a 1 standard deviation increase in congruence to correspond to a 292 "point" increase in platform concessions, or a 9.5% increase over the mean. Graph 6 depicts this change. The lower bar on the graph indicates the concession value of a group with the average level of ideological distance from the party. The upper bar indicates the concession value of a group that is 1 standard deviation greater than the mean level of ideological distance from the party. All other variables are held at their mean. 15 We generated predicted probabilities using the Clarify software developed for Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) .
The graph indicates that groups with greater ideological congruence to the Party are more likely to receive concessions on the platform, all else being equal.
The empirical results suggest that parties are selective about which interest groups' preferences it reflects in its platforms. Of course, parties are in complete control over which groups provide testimony at their hearings, and it is unreasonable to expect them to entertain testimony from groups with preferences antithetical to party interests. But by analyzing a population of groups that provided testimony, and identifying the characteristics of groups with interests successfully articulated in the platform, we provide a creative and conservative test of how groups influence party platforms. Groups that demonstrate party loyalty, and those with ideological preferences close to the party, are most likely to see their interests articulated in the platform. While parties are interested primarily in vote maximization, we find that the capacity to mobilize voters, alone, does not influence the Democratic Party to reflect a group's interests in its platform.
VI. Conclusions
Despite reasonable arguments that American party platforms are empty signals of cheap talk only of interest to party activists, we argue that platforms serve a valuable purpose for political parties and organized interests. The intended audience of the political platforms adopted at the parties' quadrennial conventions is not undecided voters or a party's political opponents. The audience is party activists, including organized groups. Parties expend so many resources to woo those that are already likely to vote in their favor because parties seek to ensure the electoral commitment of these voters, as well as their help in electing the party's candidates.
Parties view groups as an efficient way to organize and mobilize the electorate. Meanwhile, interest groups have incentives to seek a spot on a party platform because of the national spotlight it provides. Motivated by policy outcomes and interest articulation, an attentionseeking interest group finds reward in having its preferences articulated in a national document backed by an organization of leading policy makers, even if not by the individuals themselves.
Formally, we showed that parties are likely to provide concessions to groups that: can promise resources to mobilize voters, are loyal to the party, and are ideologically proximate to the party. Using unique data accessed from the Democratic Party, we conducted automated content analysis and discerned that parties are most likely to give platform concessions to groups loyal to the party and those that are ideologically similar to the party. All else being equal, parties are not inclined to give platform concessions to groups that have increased resources to mobilize voters. We suspect this is in part due to a group's inability to satisfactorily guarantee voting commitments on behalf of their membership.
Substantively, our paper offers an interesting first step toward a greater understanding of party platforms, often thought to be useless and neglected in the greater academic agenda. If parties use platforms to mobilize voters vis-à-vis interest groups, the study of those platforms and the groups that participate in their construction has implications for the analysis of networks and party-building. Further work could explore these networks by expanding the coverage of platform hearings to earlier and later dates.
Theoretically, our work has implications for the modeling of party-group interaction. We present one of the first attempts to explicitly model the interaction between two parties and two groups prior to the electoral process. In so doing, we take another important step, this time allowing voters to pull parties from the median by coalescing into groups that bargain with parties before elections.
Our analysis shows that the Democratic Party responds to mobilization potential of groups more through loyalty and ideology than through resources. Groups are rewarded not for their ability to mobilize moderate voters that might otherwise vote for Republican candidates, but for their consistent and unrelenting support of Democratic candidates. We thereby suggest that parties and groups are motivated by their need for long-term survival conceptualized through the short-term electoral gain, and that platforms matter, at least to parties and interest groups, in more ways than many of us previously thought. The number of observations in the regression analysis is less than the 80 groups on which we have testimony data because of missingness in the covariates. As we have no reason to believe that the missingness is systematic, we elect to employ listwise deletion rather than multiple imputations. 
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